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I. INTRODUCTION
To protect the innocent and punish the wicked, we as a society of-
ten choose to incarcerate criminals. By its very nature, incarceration dic-
tates that certain prisoner rights be limited in order to achieve society's
purposes.1 The difficulty arises in striking a balance between serving the
functions of incarceration and protecting the basic rights of the prisoner.2
On June 7, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit issued a split decision in Mendoza v. Carey3 that attempted to strike
such a balance. The court granted an evidentiary hearing to an inmate in
a habeas corpus proceeding,4 contrary to decisions in other jurisdictions,5
and in so doing encouraged non-English-speaking inmates to assert their
right to post-conviction appeals. The court based its decision upon the
inmate's alleged inability to either access legal materials in a language in
which he was fluent or receive assistance from a translator during the
t J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2008; B.A., History, University of Washington,
2002. The author wishes to thank his Law Review colleagues, particularly Aric Jarrett and Jonathan
Minear, for their insightful comments and suggestions. In particular, he would like to thank his par-
ents for their boundless love and support; his brother, who, from day one, has been the author's
favorite companion; and the author's excellent friends, who always remind him of what is truly
important in life.
1. George L. Blum, Annotation, Sufficiency of Access to Legal Research Facilities Afforded
Defendant Confined in State Prison or Local Jail, 98 A.L.R. 5TH 445, 458 (2002).
2. Id. at 462-63.
3.449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006).
4. Id. at 1067.
5. See discussion infra Part V.B.
1001
Seattle University Law Review
statutory period for filing habeas corpus appeals. 6 The writ of habeas
corpus is a constitutionally protected right,' its purpose being, in the
words of Chief Justice Marshall, "the liberation of those who may be
imprisoned without sufficient cause." 8 Given its importance, the Ninth
Circuit's willingness to grant broader access to the writ is a proper step
towards assuring that all prisoners, regardless of language spoken or na-
tional origin, are offered adequate access to its protections.
After a brief review in Part II of the current habeas corpus appeals
practice following the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 9 Part III of this Note will examine
the factual and procedural history of Mendoza. Next, Part IV will analyze
the case's majority and dissenting opinions. Finally, Part V contrasts
Mendoza with factually similar cases in other jurisdictions and demon-
strates that, even though the Ninth Circuit stands alone, its ruling strikes
a proper balance between limiting abuse of the writ and ensuring that it
remains available to all inmates who diligently pursue their rights.
II. HABEAS CoRPus LAW
Federal habeas corpus law is an unusual area of law, often misun-
derstood even by practitioners.' 0 Though technically a civil action, the
Supreme Court of the United States has characterized habeas practice as"unique," only generally conforming to civil practice." Because habeas
law follows neither criminal nor civil procedure, the substance and pro-
cedure of a typical habeas proceeding may well befuddle a casual ob-
server.
One such confusing aspect involves which substantive grounds a
habeas appeal may properly encompass. 2 One might assume that a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus is an extension or an appeal of the crimi-
nal action under which the petitioner was jailed, but that is not the case. 13
Instead, habeas proceedings are initiated by inmates who believe that
their continued imprisonment violates their federal constitutional
rights. 14 It is, therefore, not a means to attack ordinary procedural or sub-
stantive errors that occurred at trial; rather, errors alleged in a habeas pe-
6. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
8. Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202 (1830).
9. The portion of the AEDPA relevant to this analysis is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
10. Lisa L. Bellamy, Playing for Time: The Need for Equitable Tolling of the Habeas Corpus
Statute ofLimitations, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2004).
11. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969).
12. 20 AM. JUR. TRIALS Federal Habeas Corpus Practice § 3 (2008).
13. Id
14. Id.
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tition must rise to constitutional proportions. 1 5 For example, unless errors
at trial were so substantial and prejudicial as to implicate a constitutional
right of the petitioner, he or she may not use habeas to correct erroneous
factual determinations, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence support-
ing a conviction, or challenge the admission of evidence.16 The writ of
habeas corpus is instead a "procedural device for subjecting executive,
judicial, or private restraints on liberty to judicial scrutiny."' 7 For these
reasons, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is distinct from an appeal of
a criminal proceeding.
Procedurally, federal habeas practice can also prove confusing. 18
The process begins when a prisoner petitions the federal district court
that sentenced them for a writ of habeas corpus. 19 Because the right to
counsel 2° does not reach civil proceedings such as habeas petitions, a
petitioner must often research and draft his or her petition without legal
assistance. 2' The court may dismiss a petition for any number of rea-
sons.22 In order to better determine the validity of the petitioner's factual
allegations, the court may schedule an evidentiary hearing at any time
after the petition is filed. 23 The court will then issue a ruling on the peti-
tion.24 If the court denies the writ, the petitioner must obtain a Certificate
of Appealability in order to appeal the ruling. 25 The end result of a suc-
cessful petition ranges from a new sentencing hearing to the actual re-
lease of the prisoner, depending on the severity of the violations found.2 6
This Note focuses on postconviction petitions for habeas relief to
federal courts, whether authored by state or federal prisoners. Although
the writ is available before a conviction, such actions are rare: federal
courts nearly always require a petitioner to first exhaust his state court
remedies.27 As a result, the vast majority of habeas actions brought in
federal courts are postconviction actions brought by inmates in state or
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968).
18. For a detailed analysis of federal habeas practice, see Federal Habeas Corpus Practice,
supra note 12.
19. Id. § 69.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21. Bellamy, supra note 10, at 46.
22. See, e.g., Federal Habeas Corpus Practice, supra note 12, §§ 27, 86.
23. Id. § 86.
24. Id. § 110.
25. FED. R. APP. P. 22(b).
26. Bellamy, supra note 10, at 3.
27. Federal Habeas Corpus Practice, supra note 12, § 7.
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federal prisons.28 It is this type of habeas petition that was at issue in
Mendoza.29
In the years preceding the 1996 enactment of the AEDPA, Con-
gress sought to amend perceived inadequacies in habeas corpus law.3 °
Congressional observers had noticed for some years both a pattern of
delayed filings and an increase in the number of filings of petitions for
writs. 31 At the time, there was no restriction as to when a prisoner could
file a habeas petition,32 which resulted in the filing of a multitude of
"stale" claims.33 Congress concluded that habeas petitioners were abus-
ing the system.34 Political pressure to change habeas appeals increased
following the conviction and pending execution of Timothy McVeigh for
the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building.35 Accordingly,
Congress enacted the AEDPA.36
The AEDPA encompasses a broad range of topics, including the
streamlining of habeas and death penalty appeal procedures, the institu-
tion of mandatory victim restitution, and the implementation of various
provisions regarding international terrorist acts.37 Specifically, the
AEDPA applies a one-year limitation period to applications for a writ of
habeas corpus by inmates incarcerated pursuant to a state court judg-
ment. 38 The statute does, however, allow for statutory tolling of that one-
year period while a properly filed application for postconviction relief is
pending.39
Citing what it called an abuse of the habeas corpus practice, par-
ticularly in capital cases, 40 Congress expressed an intention to limit de-
layed and repetitive filings,41 while nevertheless providing prisoners with
adequate review "when [they] diligently pursue[] state remedies and ap-
plies for federal habeas review in a timely manner., 42
28. Id. § 8.
29. See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1066 (2006).
30. For a brief history of habeas corpus law prior to the AEDPA, see Bellamy, supra note 10,
at 3-10.
31. Id. at 7-8.
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. at 8.
34. Id. at 10.
35. Id.
36. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
37. Id. The many provisions of the AEDPA not relating to habeas corpus petitions are beyond
the scope of this Note.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
39. § 2244(d)(2).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 8 (1995).
41. Id. at 9.
42. Id.
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In addition to the AEDPA's tolling provision, courts have been
willing to allow equitable tolling of the one-year limitation on the filing
of habeas petitions. 43 While the statute is silent regarding equitable toll-
ing, a majority of courts allow it upon satisfaction of the extraordinary
circumstances test," which requires extraordinary circumstances that
were beyond the petitioner's control. 45 Because the extraordinary cir-
cumstances test necessitates a case-by-case factual analysis, 46 the doc-
trine of equitable tolling has created "a complicated, inconsistent proce-
dural morass that is difficult for the most knowledgeable legal scholar to
understand., 47 From that morass arose Mendoza.
III. THE HISTORY OF MENDOZA
Carlos Mendoza, a California state prisoner, was sentenced to four-
teen years in prison after pleading no contest to a charge of assault with a
firearm.48 Mendoza did not appeal his conviction, which became final on
August 21, 2001.49 He spent his first three months of incarceration at a
reception center, 50 where the law library contained no Spanish-language
books.51 Mendoza alleged that guards told him that he could not begin
any habeas proceedings until he arrived at his assigned prison.52 After
three months at the reception center, he was assigned to Solano State
Prison, where he again found no Spanish-language books or forms, no
postings about the AEDPA time limit in any language, and no Spanish-
speaking clerks or librarians that could assist him.53 Through conversa-
tions with other Spanish-speaking inmates in the prison yard, however,
he was eventually able to locate a bilingual inmate who agreed to assist
him in drafting his habeas petitions. 54
43. Bellamy, supra note 10, at 24.
44. Id. at 27.
45. Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.
1997).
46. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000).
47. Bellamy, supra note 10, at 53-54.
48. Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1067 (2006).
49. Id. Mendoza's conviction became final when he did not file an appeal within sixty days of
judgment. Id.
50. Id. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation sends its incoming prison-
ers to reception centers at various locations around the state before assigning them to a permanent
location. Reception Center,
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/AdultOperations/ReceptionCenter.html (last visited
May 6, 2008).
51. Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1067.
52. Id.
53. Id
54. Id.
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Mendoza finally filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus
on May 14, 2003, nearly twenty-one months after his conviction became
final. 55 Over the next year, with the help of another bilingual inmate, he
filed a second habeas petition in the Superior Court of California, a peti-
tion in the California Court of Appeals, and two petitions in the Califor-
nia Supreme Court.56 Each of these petitions was denied, with the final
denial occurring on March 17, 2004. 57 Mendoza then focused his efforts
on the United States District Court for the Central District of California,
filing a habeas petition with that court on April 3, 2004.58
On April 26, 2004, the district court required Mendoza to show
cause as to why the court should not dismiss his lone remaining petition
due to its filing more than one year after his conviction became final. 9 In
the order, the district court stated that Mendoza had failed to provide any
explanation for the lengthy delay in filing, other than allegations that he
was hindered by his lack of access to Spanish-language law books.6°
Mendoza responded on May 24, 2004, again with the help of a bilingual
inmate, that the prison law library possessed no books written in Spanish,
no Spanish-English legal dictionaries, and no postings about the AEDPA
in any language. 6' He included a declaration detailing his inability to
obtain Spanish-language legal materials at the reception center or at So-
lano State Prison. 62 Mendoza also submitted forty-seven identical form
declarations, signed by Spanish-speaking inmates, which stated the li-
brary possessed no books in Spanish that could assist the inmate in pur-
suing legal action, and that the clerks and librarians did not speak Span-
ish. 63 Finally, Mendoza asserted that he would have challenged his sen-
tence within a year if he had seen any notice of the one-year limitations
period.64
After reviewing Mendoza's response to the Order to Show Cause, a
magistrate judge recommended that Mendoza's habeas petition be dis-
missed as untimely. 65 The magistrate first ruled that statutory tolling un-
der section 2244(d)(2) did not apply in this case because Mendoza had
already passed the one-year limitation period before he petitioned the
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1068.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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state for habeas relief.66 The magistrate then ruled that Mendoza's "gen-
eral lack of legal knowledge, indigenc[e], and limited English skills are
not external factors or extraordinary circumstances beyond his control
that made it impossible for him to file a timely petition. '67 The district
court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge in
full, dismissed Mendoza's habeas petition as untimely, and declined to
issue a Certificate of Appealability upon Mendoza's timely appeal.68
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit granted a Certificate of Appealability on
(1) whether Mendoza was entitled to equitable tolling based on his in-
ability to comprehend English and the lack of Spanish-language materi-
als in the library and (2) whether the district court erred in failing to hold
an evidentiary hearing on the issue.69
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RULING IN MENDOZA
On October 17, 2005, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit heard
argument on the issues of equitable tolling and the failure to hold an evi-
dentiary hearing. 70 A split decision was filed on June 7, 2006, with the
majority deciding that Mendoza's factual allegations were sufficient to
warrant remand to the district court for a factual hearing.7'
A. The Majority Opinion
Because it was an issue of first impression, the majority opinion fo-
cused the bulk of its analysis on whether language difficulty could be
sufficient to equitably toll the one-year window for habeas petitions. 72
The court applied a de novo standard of review to the denial of the peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus; it applied an abuse of discretion standard
to the denial of an evidentiary hearing.73 In cases involving equitable
tolling, the petitioner bears the burden of showing both diligent pursuit of
his or her rights and extraordinary circumstances that stood in the way of
that pursuit.74 This burden is intentionally set very high in order to en-
courage prisoners to file habeas petitions promptly, thus effectuating a
central purpose of the AEDPA.75
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1065.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1069.
73. Id. at 1068.
74. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
75. Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
2008] 1007
Seattle University Law Review
After reviewing the facts, the panel held that an evidentiary hearing
before the district court was warranted where a prison law library lacked
Spanish-language legal materials and a petitioner was unable to obtain
translation assistance before the one-year deadline.76 Consequently, if
Mendoza could show at the evidentiary hearing that his allegations were
true, he would be entitled to equitable tolling of the statutory filing pe-
riod.77
In reaching its holding, the court necessarily looked to other cases
involving equitable tolling for guidance.78 In Whalem/Hunt v. Early, the
court held that the unavailability of the statutory text of the AEDPA in a
prison library raised enough of a question of an extraordinary barrier to
warrant remand for further development of the factual record. 79 The peti-
tioner in that case alleged that his lack of access to the AEDPA text pre-
vented him from learning of the one-year deadline and therefore from
filing his habeas petition before that deadline. 80 The court held that the
state prison's failure to provide the prisoner with access to the AEDPA
could be an extraordinary barrier to the petitioner's efforts to timely file a
habeas petition. 8'
Because Whalem/Hunt was not directly on point, inasmuch as it in-
volved the failure to provide legal materials generally and did not raise
the specific issue of language difficulty, the court also looked outside its
own jurisdiction, examining the case of Cobas v. Burgess.82 In that case,
the Sixth Circuit held that a petitioner's inability to speak, write, or un-
derstand English, in and of itself, did not automatically justify equitable
tolling.83 The petitioner in Cobas had written a detailed letter to his
counsel in English, demonstrating that he at least had access to a transla-
tor with whom he was able to effectively communicate. 84
The Mendoza court built upon this analytical framework. Even
though the Cobas court had ultimately denied relief, its reasoning left
open the possibility that a non-English speaker who could not find a will-
ing translator might qualify for equitable tolling. 85 Following the prece-
dent established by the Cobas and the Whalem/Hunt decisions, the Ninth
76. Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1071.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1069-70.
79. 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000).
80. Id
81. Id.
82. 306 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2002).
83. Id. at 444.
84. Id.
85. Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1070 (2006).
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Circuit held that Mendoza "alleged facts that, if true, may entitle him to
equitable tolling. 86
The court also noted, however, that the record before it failed to
clearly show that, even if the facts that Mendoza alleged were true, he
had diligently pursued his rights. 87 Because the district court had not in-
vestigated Mendoza's allegations regarding his inability to learn of the
AEDPA's limitations period, the Mendoza court concluded that the ap-
propriate tack was to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing that
would further develop the record.88
B. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting judge offered a different analysis of the facts alleged
by Mendoza. Circuit Judge Kleinfeld first noted that Mendoza was born
in America and had never alleged that he read Spanish.89 In addition,
Mendoza had nine months at Solano State Prison to find a bilingual in-
mate who was willing to assist him.90 Given the demographics at that
institution, it was unlikely that Mendoza had struggled to find such
help. 9'
As a legal matter, the dissent disputed the majority's reading of the
applicable precedent. 92 To begin with, the Court had previously rejected
the argument that prisoners have a right to access a law library at all, let
alone one providing materials in Spanish.93 The dissent also distin-
guished Whalem/Hunt;94 the difficulty for the petitioner in that case was
his inability to learn the statute of limitations for habeas appeals due to
dated legal materials. 95 The dissent argued that that situation differed
significantly from Mendoza's, where the information was available to
86. Id. at 1071.
87. Id. at 1071 n.6.
88. Id. at 1071. At that hearing, the prosecution would also get its first opportunity to rebut
Mendoza's contentions. Id.
89. Id. at 1072 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). The majority contended that it was safe to infer that
Mendoza read Spanish from the statements that he made in his declaration. Id. at 1066 n. I (majority
opinion). The dissent reasoned, however, that when a person was bom and raised in America, it is
"most likely" that he does not read Spanish, and that anyone who had filed as many affidavits as
Mendoza did would surely file one stating that he could read Spanish, if he could do so without
committing perjury. Id. at 1072 n.2 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1072 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
91. Id. The dissent specifically cited the forty-seven declarations of Spanish-speaking inmates
that Mendoza filed for the show-cause hearing as evidence that Mendoza was in contact with several
bilingual inmates. Id. at 1073.
92. Id. at 1074.
93. Id. (citing Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005)).
94. Id.
95. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (Tashima, J., concurring).
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him if he could find a bilingual inmate willing to translate. 96 The dissent
thus argued that the applicable precedent supported the dismissal of
Mendoza's petition.
The dissent also called the majority's reliance on Cobas misguided.
In an institution such as Solano State Prison, Mendoza should have had
little difficulty finding a bilingual inmate willing to translate for him. 97 If
such an inmate were available, Mendoza's claim should fail under the
reasoning of that case. 98
Finally, the dissent concluded by distinguishing the "real problem"
from the "fake problem" underlying the case. 99 The "real problem," it
explained, is that inmates have little hope of understanding and properly
applying the myriad of "subtleties and intricacies" of habeas law, 100 be-
cause they are not entitled to appointed counsel for habeas petitions.101
On the other hand, the "fake problem" asserted by the petitioner was the
lack of a Spanish-language legal library at Solano State Prison; Mendoza
had simply failed to show that the presence of such materials would have
made a difference. 102 The dissent thus concluded that Mendoza failed to
meet the high threshold required for a granting of equitable tolling. 103
C. Reconciling the Majority and Dissenting Opinions
Upon further analysis, the differences between the opinions of the
majority and the dissent are not as pronounced as they may seem. Both
opinions rest on a similar reading of the law, and both rely on Cobas and
Whalem/Hunt to support that reading. Both opinions express a willing-
ness to grant equitable tolling in cases where language barriers in fact
prevent the petitioner from diligently pursuing his or her rights. The dif-
ference lies in the judges' readings of the facts of this specific case.
While the majority was willing to grant Mendoza the opportunity to cor-
rect any deficiencies in the record through remand to the district court for
96. Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1074 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1072.
98. Cobas v. Burgess, 2002 FED App. 0334P (6th Cir.) (quoting Dunlap v. United States, 2001
FED App. 01 50P (6th Cir.)) (holding that "the existence of a translator who can read and write Eng-
lish and who assists a petitioner during his appellate proceedings implies that a petitioner will not
have a reasonable cause for remaining ignorant of the legal requirement for filing his claim").
99. Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1074 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1074-75.
101. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).
102. Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1075 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). The dissent nevertheless agreed
that an inmate who is not American-born, or who understands and reads a more exotic language that
no other prisoner speaks, may in fact be entitled to equitable tolling. Id.
103. Id.
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an evidentiary hearing, 104 the dissent concluded that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to warrant such a remand. 105
The conclusion reached in Mendoza does not require all jails in the
Ninth Circuit to provide native-language legal materials to inmates who
demand such materials. 106 The holding merely acknowledged that where
language difficulties presented an extraordinary circumstance that pre-
vented the petitioner from timely filing a habeas petition, he or she de-
serves an opportunity to show diligent pursuit of legal rights despite that
impediment.10 7 If the petitioner can demonstrate diligent pursuit, he or
she may be entitled to an equitable tolling of the habeas appeals pe-
riod. 108
Mendoza has significantly impacted habeas practice throughout the
Ninth Circuit and beyond; as of April 10, 2008, sixty-eight judicial opin-
ions have cited it. 109 While many of these decisions mention Mendoza
only briefly, some focus on facts substantially similar to those in Men-
doza, with the court remanding in three of those cases. 10 As a result,
while Mendoza does not stand for the proposition that all inmates have a
direct right to access legal materials in their native language, it does re-
quire a thorough analysis of habeas petitions that request equitable toll-
ing because of language difficulties.
V. MENDOZA: COMING OUT OF LEFT FIELD
The Ninth Circuit, in Mendoza, became the first circuit to remand a
habeas appeal for further findings on the premise that language difficul-
ties could create an extraordinary barrier to the filing of a petition for
habeas corpus relief.111 Decisions from other circuits and even from the
Supreme Court show that the holding in Mendoza represents a departure
from a nationwide trend denying a right both to access legal materials in
general and to access legal materials in a language one can compre-
hend.112
104. Id. at 1071, n.6 (majority opinion).
105. Id. at 1075 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
106. See id at 1071 (majority opinion).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Johnson v. Chandler, 224 F. App'x 515 (7th Cir. 2007); Pelayo v. Hall, 209 F.
App'x 741 (9th Cir. 2006); Pham v. Ryan, 203 F. App'x 769 (9th Cir. 2006); Nguyen v. Lamarque,
203 F. App'x 762 (9th Cir. 2006).
110. See, e.g., Pham, 203 F. App'x at 770 (holding that where petitioner is illiterate and unable
to speak English, and where the prisoner who had previously assisted him in filing court documents
had been transferred, the petitioner was entitled to additional time in which to answer a motion to
dismiss his habeas petition).
11. Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1071.
112. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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This Part begins with an analysis of the development of rulings on
prisoners' access to legal materials (a relatively recent phenomenon) as a
whole. It then focuses on decisions in analogous cases from other cir-
cuits. This analysis will show that the Ninth Circuit is alone in allowing
equitable tolling of the habeas filing period in these situations. The Part
concludes that, although it may stand alone among the circuit courts, the
Ninth Circuit has crafted a standard that protects access to the writ of
habeas corpus for all prisoners.
A. The Prisoner's "Right" to Access Legal
Materials Is a Recent Development
While the Constitution grants prisoners no express right to access
legal materials, the Court has often interpreted the requirement that a
prisoner have adequate and meaningful access to the courts to include
access to legal materials. 1 3 Jurisprudence in this area stems from the
Court's decision in Bounds v. Smith, in which it acknowledged that pris-
oners have a constitutional right to access the courts in an adequate, ef-
fective, and meaningful manner. 114 The Bounds Court held that such ac-
cess to the legal system requires that prison authorities assist inmates in
the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing pris-
oners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law. 11 5
The Court later narrowed the Bounds rule in Lewis v. Casey.'16 In
that case, the Court clarified that Bounds did not create a direct right to a
law library or legal assistance; rather, that decision merely affirmed the
right of access to the courts. 1 7 Thus, to demonstrate an injury under
Bounds and Lewis, an inmate must prove that the alleged shortcomings in
the prison library or legal assistance program hindered the inmate's ef-
forts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. 18 For example, even if a peti-
tioner is denied access to legal resources, he or she must demonstrate that
this lack of access led to his or her inability to put forth a nonfrivolous
claim. 119
As a practical matter, courts differ drastically in their understand-
ings of the standard set forth by the Bounds and Lewis decisions. For ex-
ample, in Green v. Ferrell, the Fifth Circuit held that a prison's practice
113. Blum, supra note 1, at 474.
114.430 U.S. 817, 821-22 (1977).
115. Blum, supra note 1, at 459-60.
116. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
117. Id. at 351.
118. Id. at 3 51-53.
119. Id.
1012 [Vol. 3 1: 1001
Habeas Corpus Law After Mendoza v. Carey
of limiting prisoners to checking out only two law books at a time, twice
a week, denied the prisoners meaningful access to the courts.12 But in
Wilson v. Bruce, the court held that such access is not denied merely by a
prison's implementation of reasonable restrictions on access to the law
library. 12 Because meaningful access must be ascertained on a case-by-
case basis, this standard has been interpreted in a myriad of ways. 122
B. Post-AEDPA Case Law on Access to
Legal Materials Contradicts Mendoza
Since the 1996 enactment of the AEDPA, several cases have inter-
preted portions of that statute relating to habeas filing period; the deci-
sions have almost uniformly denied equitable tolling. These rulings show
that other courts tend to allow equitable tolling only in extremely limited
circumstances, perhaps valuing judicial efficiency over an assurance of
access to the constitutionally guaranteed writ of habeas corpus. For ex-
ample, in Gibson v. Klinger, the petitioner argued that the one-year filing
limitation period should have tolled while he was pursuing an appeal in
the Oklahoma state court system.123 The Tenth Circuit held that his in-
ability to secure a copy of the AEDPA was not a sufficient impediment
to justify equitable tolling. 124 Equitable tolling, the court stated, is per-
mitted only in "rare and exceptional circumstances," such as when a
prisoner is actually innocent, when another party's conduct prevents a
prisoner from timely filing, or when a prisoner actively pursues judicial
remedies but files a defective pleading during the statutory period. 25 No
such circumstances existed in Gibson.'26 The court concluded that "a
claim of insufficient access to relevant law, such as AEDPA, is not
enough to support equitable tolling," and affirmed the dismissal of the
petition. 121
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has been reluctant to grant equitable
tolling of the habeas filing period. In Cobas v. Burgess, the court af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus. 128 The petitioner conceded that, because it was not filed within one
year of the date that his conviction became final, his petition was
120. 801 F.2d 765, 773 (5th Cir. 1986).
121. 816 F. Supp. 679, 680 (D. Kan. 1993).
122. For a more substantive view of the different rulings on this issue, see Blum, supra note 1,
at 469-97.
123. 232 F.3d 799, 802 (10th Cir. 2000).
124. Id. at 808.
125. Id. (quoting Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 2002 FED App. 0334P (6th Cir.).
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time-barred. He contended, however, that the doctrine of equitable toll-
ing applied, because he was born and raised in Cuba and was unable to
understand, read, or write the English language.129 Pointing to the peti-
tioner's proven ability to gain access to the courts, as demonstrated by
previous pleadings that he filed in state court appeals, the court held that
an inability to speak, write, or understand English, in and of itself, does
not automatically give reasonable cause for equitable tolling. 30 Al-
though the court acknowledged numerous mistakes in the petitioner's
state court pleadings,13 1 it reasoned that, because he had successfully
filed them, he was capable of understanding the legal requirements for
filing his habeas petition. 32 The result in Cobas exemplifies the unwill-
ingness of most circuit courts to apply equitable tolling in habeas filing
period cases.
The Eleventh Circuit has also declined to apply equitable tolling to
a habeas appeal when a petitioner has alleged language difficulties. In
United States v. Montano, the petitioner appealed the denial of his mo-
tion to file an untimely motion for review of his sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 2255, the statutory equivalent of the AEDPA for federal prison-
ers. i33 He alleged that he was actually innocent and that language diffi-
culties prevented him from discovering the possibility of challenging his
conviction in federal court before the one-year limitation period ex-
pired. 134 Relegating this argument to a mere footnote, the court stated
that language difficulties do not constitute "extraordinary circumstances"
worthy of equitable tolling. 135 The Montano court's unwillingness to de-
vote substantial analysis to the petitioner's language argument demon-
strates that it believed that language barriers are not relevant to equitable
tolling.
The Fourth Circuit has also denied equitable tolling when a peti-
tioner has alleged language difficulties in challenging his conviction un-
der § 2255. In United States v. Sosa, the petitioner argued that the court
should toll the one-year appeal period because language difficulties had
impeded his ability to comply with the statutory deadline. 36 The court,
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 398 F.3d 1276, 1277 (1 ith Cir. 2005).
134. Id. at 1280 n.5.
135. Id.
136. 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004). The petitioner provided four other grounds supporting
his claim for equitable tolling: (1) he had misunderstood the resetting of the statutory period after the
dismissal of his first motion; (2) he was actively litigating a motion to reduce his sentence during the
period; (3) it took seven months for the district court to rule on his first motion; and (4) he had a
mental condition which justified equitable tolling. 1d.
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however, refused to invoke the doctrine, citing the numerous pleadings
filed by the petitioner as evidence that he possessed sufficient profi-
ciency in the English language to be held to the statutory deadline. 137
As the decisions in Gibson, Cobas, Montano, and Sosa show, most
jurisdictions employ a strong presumption against equitable tolling when
language barriers caused a defendant to miss the AEDPA's filing dead-
line. 138 Courts in these jurisdictions afford greater weight to Congress's
desire to limit abuse of habeas appeals than to a petitioner's right to have
adequate access to the writ.' 39 Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated-
in a footnote-that it has never decided whether equitable tolling should
even apply to the AEDPA's statute of limitations. 140 Accordingly, a pre-
sumption against equitable tolling has evolved when language barriers
are involved; in fact, the very right to equitable tolling of the AEDPA's
limitations period may prove illusory.
The Ninth Circuit, however, countered this trend, in a case decided
before Mendoza, by permitting equitable tolling when a petitioner lacked
access to legal materials. In Whalem/Hunt, the law library in the peti-
tioner's prison did not receive legal materials describing the AEDPA
until June 1998, nearly two years after Congress enacted it, and well after
the petitioner's window to petition for habeas relief closed. 141 Reversing
the district court's dismissal of the petition as untimely, the panel re-
manded the case for consideration of whether the petitioner had a valid
reason for not meeting the one-year deadline that would entitle him to
equitable tolling. 142 In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Tashima
stated that "the inability to learn and be guided by such critically impor-
tant procedural rules as the governing limitations period" might be a suf-
ficient reason to equitably toll. 143 This decision opened the door for the
Ninth Circuit's later expansion of the doctrine to include language diffi-
culties in Mendoza. 144
Decisions from other circuits and from the Supreme Court tend to
limit equitable tolling, especially in circumstances involving language
barriers. Under these cases, language difficulties do not warrant equitable
tolling because they are not sufficient impediments to a prisoner's right
to access the courts. The Ninth Circuit, however, has followed a different
path, by laying the groundwork in Whalem/Hunt, and then holding in
137. Id. at 512-13.
138. See discussion supra Part V.B.
139. See discussion supra Part V.B.
140. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 n.8 (2005).
141. Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1147 (9th Cir. 2000).
142. Id. at 1148.
143. Id. at 1149 (Tashima, J., concurring).
144. Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Mendoza, that the inability to access either legal materials in one's
language or the help of a translator can provide a sufficient ground for
the equitable tolling of the statutory limitations period for postconviction
relief.
C. Mendoza Properly Protects the Habeas
Corpus Rights ofAll Inmates
The Mendoza court's concern with ensuring equal access to the writ
of habeas corpus properly reflects the writ's important role in protecting
the rights of prisoners, while still addressing the concerns with abuse of
the system that led to the passing of the AEDPA.145 Without the freedom
to make determinations regarding equitable tolling, the one-year statu-
tory limitation period created by the AEDPA goes too far in restricting
the right to habeas appeal. 146 Although the Court had summarily rejected
the practice of limiting the right to habeas appeal based upon the amount
of time that had passed between conviction and filing of a petition, 47
Congress later imposed just such a restriction in the AEDPA. Equitable
tolling is thus the only mechanism available to the judiciary to protect the
habeas rights of prisoners.
The court in Mendoza demonstrated a proper use of equitable toll-
ing. Granted, the holding from Mendoza may lead to more petitioners
requesting equitable tolling in the Ninth Circuit and may thus place an
increased burden on judicial resources within the circuit. Because Men-
doza only allows tolling in limited circumstances, however, this increase
in habeas petitions should remain well below the number of habeas peti-
tions filed in the years preceding the enactment of the AEDPA, when
petitioners were allowed to file for habeas relief indiscriminately. 148 The
ruling in Mendoza, therefore, strikes the correct balance between protec-
tion of the right of equal access to the writ of habeas corpus and preven-
tion of abuse of the habeas procedure.
VI. CONCLUSION
Through its holding in Mendoza, the Ninth Circuit distanced itself
from the nationwide trend against granting equitable tolling when a peti-
tioner alleges an inability to file a timely petition for habeas relief due to
language difficulties. The court plainly established that, in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, a Spanish-speaking prisoner's allegations that his or her law library
possessed no Spanish books, no Spanish-English legal dictionaries, and
145. Bellamy, supra note 10, at 53.
146. Id. at 54.
147. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1986).
148. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
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no postings about the AEDPA in any language can suffice to equitably
toll the AEDPA's limitations period. 49 This holding properly moves
away from thirty years of jurisprudence questioning not only whether
petitioners have a right to access legal materials in their language of flu-
ency but also whether prisoners have a right to access legal materials at
all. 150
Because the Mendoza court created the opportunity for a more
thorough review of habeas petitions impeded by language difficulties, the
writ of habeas corpus in the Ninth Circuit better protects the constitu-
tional rights of all inmates, not just those who speak English proficiently.
The court properly placed a premium on the constitutional guarantee of
access to the writ of habeas corpus, and its holding wisely harmonized
this mandate and Congress's desire to limit abuses of the procedure af-
fording such access.
149. Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1067.
150. See, e.g., Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977).
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